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Abstract This paper develops a model of earnings and applies this to an examination of the e¤ect of lifelong
learning on mens wages. Using data from the British Household Panel Survey, a variant of the mover-stayer
model is developed in which hourly wages are either taken from a stationary distribution (movers) or are closely
related to the hourly wage one year earlier (stayers). Mover-stayer status is not observed and we therefore
model wages using an endogenous switching regression, estimated by maximum likelihood. Methodologically,
the results support the mover-stayer characterisation since the restrictions required for the simpler specications
popular in the literature are rejected. Substantively, simulation of the estimated model shows some statistically
signicant e¤ects from acquiring qualications of a higher level than those previously held, but not from acquiring
qualications of the same level.
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1 Introduction
In a number of advanced economies it has become increasingly common for people to undertake lifelong learning,
that is a period of study after the completion of formal education. For example, Holmlund et al. (2008) report
that in 2002 just over forty percent of Swedish university entrants had completed secondary school more than ve
years earlier, while only about one third progressed to university within one year of completing secondary school.
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, about thirty percent of both men and women with a degree-level qualication
by age twenty-nine acquired it after having had a break from full-time education (Purcell et al. 2007). In 1994,
thirty-one percent of new undergraduates were aged twenty-ve or over; by 2007 this proportion had risen to
forty-three percent (Higher Education Statistics Agency 1995, Higher Education Statistics Agency 2008). Using
a much broader denition of lifelong learning, the UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning (2009) indicates that
in the United Kingdom over fty percent of adults aged twenty-six to forty-ve report recent participation in
some form of adult learning or education, with a participation rate of forty-one percent for people aged forty-six
to fty-ve and twenty-one percent for people aged fty-six to sixty-ve.
Individuals may participate in lifelong learning for various reasons. One motive may be a desire to progress
in the labour market. However, evidence on the e¤ectiveness of lifelong learning is mixed. In the United States,
Light (1995) reports a range of penalties to interrupted education. These depend on the number of years of
education before the interruption, the duration of the interruption and the total number of years of education.
Holmlund et al. (2008) come to similar conclusions for Sweden although they also suggest that the penalty
erodes with time. In contrast, Ferrer & Menendez (2014) suggest that, in Canada, graduates who delay their
education receive a premium relative to those who do not. Adult learning is particularly common in the United
Kingdom; in 2004 more than fteen percent of thirty to thirty-nine year-olds were students, a higher level than
in any other OECD country (OECD 2009). Here too, though, it is not clear that such learning brings benets
in terms of increased earnings potential. Egerton & Parry (2001) report substantial penalties for late learners
while Jenkins et al. (2002) nd little evidence that qualications gained between the ages of thirty-three and
forty-two increase hourly wage growth for men. de Coulon & Vignoles (2008), on the other hand, nd a positive
wage e¤ect of qualications acquired between the ages of twenty-six and thirty-four, which varies depending
on the level of qualication. Blanden et al. (2012) also provide evidence of long-term positive wage impacts of
lifelong learning but suggest that, for men especially, these are slow to appear, while Evans et al. (2013) discuss
the more general social context of lifelong learning.
In this paper, we develop a model of mens wages that allows the evolution of individuals wages to be
inuenced by whether they achieved any qualications through lifelong learning, as well as by a range of
background characteristics. We use it to explore the e¤ects of lifelong learning. We base our analysis on the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a nationally representative longitudinal survey dataset spanning the
period from 1991-2007.
Our modelling approach allows some people to receive a wage that is a random draw from a stationary
distribution, while others have a wage that is closely related to that of the previous year. Conceptually, this
is a variant of the mover-stayer model (Goodman 1961) and the econometric framework we develop builds
upon earlier research applying the model to income dynamics (Dutta et al. 2001). The rst group those whose
wage is a random draw are moversin the sense that their position in the wage distribution is (conditionally)
unrelated to their previous position. The second group are stayersby analogous reasoning and, intuitively,
might be interpreted as having a more stable wage trajectory. Essentially, the model allows wages to be estimated
using linear regression and whether the individual is a mover or a stayer (which is unobserved and is therefore
identied probabilistically). In the case of movers, the regression is in levels while for the stayers the regression
is in di¤erences.
The limited size of the sample means that it is not possible to examine separately all combinations of
qualication levels before and after undertaking lifelong learning. We therefore measure initial educational
attainment using the broad categories provided by the BHPS. We then distinguish those who undertake lifelong
learning without moving to a higher category, from those who upgrade their educational attainment level as
a result of life-long learning. It is, however, possible that the people who gain qualications di¤er in some
fundamental way from those who do not. We address this by introducing control dummies which indicate
people who gain qualications at some time during the period in which they are observed. Once again, we
distinguish qualications which do not change the level of attainment from those which do.
Both cross-sectional wage equations and wage equations in rst di¤erences are nested within our more
general model. Our analysis suggests that both of these common specications should be rejected in favour of
our more general model. This result compounds the ndings from Dutta et al. (2001) who showed that the
mover-stayer structure o¤ered a better means of understanding income inequality in the UK than did other
popular specications.
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The results further our understanding of the e¤ectiveness of lifelong learning. Our model is su¢ ciently
exible to allow identication of the routes by which lifelong learning might a¤ect wages. Specically, it
becomes possible to assess not only whether lifelong learning a¤ects wages directly but also whether it has a
role in assigning individuals to be movers or stayers and thereby have their wages subject to di¤ering sets of
inuences.
The paper has the following structure. The next section describes our data and the pattern of lifelong
learning shown by them. In section 3 we set out our econometric approach. Given the multivariate nature of
our model, simulation methods have to be used to show the e¤ects of lifelong learning on earnings. These results
are presented in Section 4. In section 5 we discuss the relationship between our ndings and other related work.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Wages and lifelong learning in the British Household Panel Survey
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) started in 1991 and is an annual survey of each adult member of
a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 households (around 10,000 individuals). Among other
things, it provides information on employment status, pay, hours worked and educational attainment on a
continuing basis. It is a longitudinal survey with the same individuals interviewed in each successive wave. If
an individual leaves the original household, that individual together with all the adult members in their new
household will also be interviewed. Children become eligible for interview when they reach the age of sixteen.
The sample thus remains representative of the British population as it changes through the 1990s and 2000s.
We focus on data collected from the original sample households over seventeen waves from 1991 to 2007.
Members of these households are repeatedly surveyed regardless of changes to household membership. In
common with most analyses of wages (see, for example, Dickens (2000), Ramos (2003), Cappellari & Jenkins
(2008), Ulrick (2008), Meghir & Pistaferri (2004) and Lillard & Willis (1978)), we consider only employed men.1
We limit ourselves to those aged twenty-ve to sixty in order to concentrate on working lives beyond completion
of the conventional period of education. Thus, for men younger than twenty-ve in 1991 or older than sixty in
2007, we consider only the data they provide while in this age range. We drop observations where individuals
report themselves as self-employed because of the di¢ culties in dening their hourly wages. We also ignore
those who provide proxy responses or whose data are incomplete while they are in this age range. Our sample
is conned to those who respond in successive waves  where there is a break in response, that individual
only features in our estimation sample up to the wave in which that break occurred. Finally, we trim the
data to remove the observations whose reported hourly wages fall into the top and bottom one percent of the
distribution.
In our analysis we dene lifelong learning as the acquisition of any qualications after the age of twenty-ve.
This age threshold was chosen in order to allow for a period to elapse following the completion of full-time
education for most people. We focus on qualication acquisition rather than participation in training since
this is more fully recorded in the data but also since this has merit in its own right. We look at the e¤ects of
lifelong learning since 1991 or after reaching the age of twenty-ve, whichever comes later. The BHPS does not,
however, tell us about people who undertook lifelong learning before the rst wave of the survey in 1991.
Overall, there are 12,018 useable observations in the data. Table 1 shows how this sample is spread across
the di¤erent waves of the survey. Due to the need to observe both qualication acquisition and wage change
over the previous year, the rst wave is dropped from the analysis, resulting in an estimation sample made up
of 10,212 observations, relating to 1,511 men.
We note some consequences of the sample specication. Because we include only consecutive responses,
dropping a single year due to self-employment means that we retain observations on individuals prior to the
point of rst being self-employed. It may be that individuals choose self-employment because of obstacles to
nding work as an employee. Alternatively, it may be that those who change jobs more frequently and so are
more likely to be movers are also more likely to try self-employment at some point. In any event, dropping
observations from the point of self-employment onwards may result in disproportionately discarding movers.2
As another possibility, if our treatment of outlier wages results in dropping individuals who in fact do have large
wage variation, the sample will end up under-stating the degree of earnings mobility.
As table 1 makes clear, the data set from which we estimated our model is subject to attrition; we begin
with 1806 observations and in the nal wave have 214 observations. To explore the nature of attrition, we used
1 This is to avoid the complications around female labour supply, where fertility decisions are more important.
2 Across all waves, 10.5 per cent of the sample are dropped due to being self-employed; 13.4 per cent of workers. To
provide some sense of how this might a¤ect our results, we re-estimated the econometric model described later, excluding
individuals who were self-employed at any point. The resulting estimates of lifelong learning are similar to those found
when not excluding those self-employed at any point.
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Wave No. Consecutive Proportion Cumulative
Responses Proportion
1 1,806 15.02 15.02
2 1,511 12.57 27.59
3 1,216 10.11 37.71
4 1,040 8.65 46.36
5 902 7.5 53.86
6 799 6.65 60.51
7 722 6.01 66.51
8 642 5.34 71.85
9 586 4.87 76.73
10 529 4.4 81.13
11 466 3.88 85
12 406 3.38 88.38
13 353 2.94 91.32
14 310 2.59 93.9
15 276 2.3 96.2
16 243 2.02 98.22
17 211 1.78 100
Total 12,018 100
Table 1 Derivation of the Sample
the test described by Fitzgerald et al. (1998). We regressed initial log hourly wages on a vector of observed
characteristics and also a dummy variable indicating whether someone dropped out of the panel at some point.
The coe¢ cient on this dummy was signicant (t=3.52 ) indicating that observed variables did not fully account
for the link between response and the wage rate. To proceed, we constructed a variable to control for selection
on unobservables. We estimated a probit model of drop-out in each wave and used the generalised residual from
this as a control function when estimating our model3 . Details are provided in appendix A.
2.1 The pattern of lifelong learning
The BHPS provides very detailed information on qualications. These were classied to match the national
scale which ranges from 0 (for those with no or only minimal qualications) to 5 for those with post-graduate
degrees. The system was originally designed to represent national vocational qualications (NVQs) but academic
qualications have also been calibrated against it, allowing most qualications to be represented on an equal
basis. Table 2 shows this classication. In common with other work (e.g. de Coulon & Vignoles (2008)) we have
treated all GCSEs4 as being in category 1.
Table 2 also indicates the number of people gaining qualications in our sample. These data relate to the 1,511
men of our sample but cover only those qualications gained from wave 2 onwards. While they show over seven
hundred qualications gained, a substantial proportion gained more than one qualication. Thus 1,131 men did
not report any qualications, 204 gained one qualication, 82 reported two qualications and 94 reported three
or more qualications over the period they were observed. Much the largest category of qualications gained
is other. However, table 2 also shows considerable importance of City and Guilds qualications. Sub-degree
higher education qualications (HNC/HND or university diploma) are more common than university degrees,
while not many respondents report gaining GCSEs or A-levels. Acquisition of qualications does not, of course,
mean that someones educational attainment, as represented by the level of their highest qualication, increases.
As noted in the introduction, we distinguish acquisition of qualications without any increase in educational
attainment from upgrading of educational attainment in our subsequent analysis. Those who gain other
qualications are treated as not having upgraded their educational attainment; thus people initially with only
minimal qualications remain at Level 0 even after gaining an otherqualication.
3 Results available on request showed that our ndings are robust to assuming that attrition is random.
4 The General Certicate of Secondary Education(GCSE) is normally taken by children at the age of sixteen, while
AS-levels are taken at age seventeen and A-levels at age eighteen. Two A-levels are the minumum qualication required
for study at university although in practice most universities require three A-levels. Scotland has its own system of
qualications; these have been converted into the equivalents from the rest of the United Kingdom.
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Classication Qualication No. Gained
Level 1 Youth Training Cert. 2
Trade Apprenticeship 2
Clerical or Commercial 14
City and Guilds Pt i 56
NVQ/SVQ Level 1 11
Any GCSEs 9
Level 2 City and Guilds Pt ii 28
NVQ/SVQ Level 2 15
Any GNVQ 13
Any AS or A- levels 3
Level 3 City and Guilds Pt iii 14
ONC, OND, BEC Gen Cert. 12
NVQ/SVQ Level 3 9
Any Higher grades 3
Level 4 HNC, HND, BEC Higher Cert. 13
Nursing SEN, SRN, SCM 3
Teaching 10
NVQ/SVQ Level 4 8
Level 5 University Diploma 26
Univ/CNAA rst degree 12
Univ/CNAA higher degree 16
Unclassied 489
Total 768
Table 2 The Classication of Qualications and the Number gained as a Result of Lifelong Learning in our Sample
Table 3 provides a summary picture of the extent of lifelong learning in terms of the qualication levels shown
in table 2. The data here relate only to the 902 men for whom we have observations for ve years or more;
this provides a picture of the incidence of lifelong learning. The main panel of the table compares individuals
highest current qualications when rst observed to their highest qualication ve years later. This captures
the prevalence of lifelong learning that results in qualication upgrading. The rst row below the transition
table shows the probability of upgrading to be fairly evenly spread across qualications levels (the somewhat
smaller rate for those with level 2 qualications is based on a small sample size). We note that those with
level 5 qualications cannot upgrade, by denition. A very di¤erent impression is formed when considering the
incidence of lifelong learning without upgrading qualications. Here there is a clear gradient. Among those
with no qualications, only ve percent will undertake some learning. This compares with twenty-four percent
for those with level 5 qualications.
One might expect that those with the lowest initial qualications would have the most to gain from lifelong
learning, and that therefore the prevalence would be highest for those educated to levels 0 or 1. There are a
number of reasons why this might not be the case but it is possible only to speculate about them. Perhaps most
obviously, people who are already reasonably well-educated may be better aware of the opportunities available to
them than those who are poorly educated. But it is also possible that less-educated people may have di¢ culties
in managing the costs associated with gaining qualications5 or that they may believe that their capacity to
benet from further qualications is limited. Further, these gures show only the proportions of people who
have actually gained qualications and not those who have embarked on courses, but not completed them. For
obvious reasons surveys do not ask people about qualications they have worked towards but failed to obtain.
Finally, if the return to acquiring a particular qualication is proportional to initial earnings, then the incentives
to undertake lifelong learning may be higher for those with more than minimal initial qualications.
There is a risk that people who embark on lifelong learning may drop out of the BHPS. That might seem
a substantial risk if most lifelong learning involved moving away from home to attend a college or university.
But table 2 suggests that only about eight percent of lifelong learning qualications are university qualications
and data from the Higher Education Statistics Authority indicate that in the academic year 1999/2000 eight-six
percent of rst-year students aged twenty-ve and over were part-time students. Such students will not have
the same reasons as full-time students to move away to go to university, and are therefore much less likely to be
lost from the survey. Thus, while it cannot be established denitively, it seems unlikely that the participation
5 Costs of courses vary very greatly, so it is not possible to draw any generalisations.
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Initial qualication level
Percentages 0 1 2 3 4 5 All
Qualication 0 95.4 - - - - - 20.5
level 1 3.1 96.5 - - - - 31.0
ve 2 0.0 0.7 98.6 - - - 8.1
years 3 1.6 1.1 0.0 95.2 - - 16.0
later 4 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.4 94.9 - 8.8
5 0.0 1.1 1.4 3.5 5.1 100.0 15.6
Upgrading 4.6 3.5 1.4 4.8 5.1 - 3.4
Lifelong learning 5.2 7.8 16.7 16.6 20.3 24.2 12.8
N 194 284 72 145 79 128 902
Table 3 Transition Probabilities over a Five-year Window and the Incidence of Lifelong Learning
incidences shown in table 3 are importantly a¤ected by attrition. In any case, as mentioned earlier, our results
are corrected for attrition due to unobserved causes.
2.2 Wages and lifelong learning
The BHPS did not introduce an explicit question on hourly pay until wave 8. However, in all waves it asks
employees to give information on the number of hours they work in a normal week and the number of hours
they worked as overtime. The survey also collects usual monthly earnings before tax and other deductions in




12  (weekly regular hours+ 1:5 weekly overtime hours)
(1)
We use the calendar year average of the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX)
to deate nominal wages to 2007 prices. We refer to this deated variable as the hourly wage.
Table 4 provides a summary of average hourly wages for the men in our sample, di¤erentiating between
those with no lifelong learning, those who undertake lifelong learning without upgrading their highest level of
qualication and those who do upgrade their highest level of qualication as a result of lifelong learning. This
shows that wages mostly increase with qualication level. Lifelong learning with no qualication upgrade is
associated with modestly higher wages, for all except those with qualications at level 4. Where qualications
are upgraded as a result of lifelong learning, the apparent premium is larger, particularly for those initially with
level 2 qualications or higher.
These statistics suggest a connection between lifelong learning and earnings. But to understand whether
there is indeed a return to lifelong learning, a full econometric analysis is necessary.
3 Econometric analysis
In this section, we discuss in more detail the mover-stayer model, describe the econometric approach and present
estimation results.
3.1 A Mover-stayer Framework
The original mover-stayer model was described by Goodman (1961). In our model we describe as movers people
who may receive a wage rate possibly very di¤erent from what they had earned in the previous period they
move about the wage distribution.7 The wages of the stayers are, by contrast, closely explained by their previous
wage rates. It is, however, not possible to observe whether someone is either a mover or a stayer in any period.
The most one can do is infer a probability of being in one category or the other.
There are a number of possible reasons why people might be movers. Perhaps the most obvious is that they
lose their jobs and have to take whatever the labour market o¤ers. But they may also be people who have been
6 This is a derived variable wPAYGU.
7 The original mover-stayer model (Goodman 1961) considered a population on which categorical data were observed.
Some members, movers, were subject to a Markov process while others, stayers, retained their initial category.
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Initial education No lifelong With qualication With upgrading Total
level learning no upgrading
Observations
0 1,795 204 158 2,157
1 2,606 477 203 3,286
2 632 214 49 895
3 1,211 413 63 1,687
4 609 240 40 889
5 923 375 1,298
All 7,776 1,923 513 10,212
Wages
0 £ 8.00 £ 9.77 £ 10.06
1 £ 10.29 £ 11.09 £ 11.74
2 £ 10.70 £ 10.96 £ 15.12
3 £ 13.23 £ 13.46 £ 14.98
4 £ 15.07 £ 14.12 £ 18.80
5 £ 17.60 £ 18.41
Table 4 Summary Data: Initial Qualications, Wages and Lifelong Learning, 1996-2008 Average. Pooled Data 2007
Prices
in stagnant jobs with little prospect for progression who have the good fortune to come across more favourable
labour market opportunities. Or people who have done reasonably well but still nd that a better opportunity
has come along. Being a mover need not be associated with a change of employer. It is perfectly possible that
people will move from one post to another o¤ering sharply better pay with the same employer. It is rather less
likely that someones wage rate will fall sharply while they remain with the same employer, if for no other reason
than such a change would be likely to appear as constructive dismissal. Nevertheless, one might expect to see
some connection between being a mover and a change of job.
While there may be a number of ways in which movers and stayers could be dened, the approach we adopt
is that movers are assumed to receive a wage rate set by a standard Mincerian wage equation in the levels of
wages. For these movers the wage rate of the previous period has no bearing on the current wage rate except,
of course, insofar as both are a¤ected by the same individual characteristics, such as the level of education. For
stayers by contrast, the idea that the wage rate is closely related to that of the previous period points naturally
to their wages being determined by an equation in the rst di¤erence of log wages.
There is no observed characteristic which makes possible a precise distinction between movers and stayers.
Rather we assume that the process is driven by a latent variable; it is thus determined statistically. The estimated
model allows us to determine the probability that particular observations are those of stayers rather than movers
or vice versa. Our model can be seen as a switching regression in which the two distinct states cannot be identied
except through estimation of the model and is of the type rst discussed by Quandt (1958); it o¤ers a means of
dealing with heterogeneity in the data.
The model encompasses the standard rst di¤erences model if all hourly wages can be explained by the
stayersequation and an equation in terms of levels if the probability of being a mover is one. In section 5 we
present estimates of the number of years that someone should expect to be a stayer. The model structure is
such that this should be expected to depend on observable characteristics. If everyone were a mover, the number
of years expected as a stayer would be little di¤erent from zero. On the other hand, if everyone were a stayer,
this number would simply be the remainder of an individuals working life. The fact that within our ninety-ve
percent condence limits neither of these is the case supports our mover-stayer specication relative to either of
these simplications. In section 4 we compare this model against pooled OLS models in levels and di¤erences
and also against a xed e¤ects panel model.
We now set out the components of the mover-stayer model. The choice of explanatory variables is discussed
subsequently in section 3.6.
3.2 Movers
For movers, wages are given by a stationary Mincerian equation
yit = Xit1 + u1it (2)
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where yit represents log hourly wages deated by the retail price index and Xit is a vector of variables which
inuence the wage rate. Such variables include age, qualications, lifelong learning, region of residence, log real
GDP per capita and a measure of local unemployment. They also include the generalised residual of the probit
equation to control for attrition bias (Appendix A). Thus, for a mover, the wage rate is not directly related to
previous wages except insofar as the variables which inuence the wage of a mover have also inuenced their
wage on the previous occasion when they were a mover.
3.3 Stayers
The hourly wages of stayers are assumed to be related to those of the previous period. We specify the stayers
wage equation in rst di¤erences as
yit = Xit2 + u2it (3)
It should be noted that there is no loss of generality in specifying the vector of driving variables Xit to be
the same in both equations; provided it is general enough, di¤erences in specication can be accommodated by
restrictions on the elements of 1 and 2:
3.4 Switching
A respondent is a mover if the indicator variable Iit = 0 and a stayer if Iit = 1: This indicator is driven by the
latent variable, Iit: The probability, Pit that observation yit is drawn from (3) rather than (2) is driven by the
latent variable,
Iit = Zit + "it (4)
with Iit = 0 if I

it  0 and Iit = 1 if Iit > 0: As already noted, the indicator variable is not observed. It is
possible, through the application of Bayestheorem, to infer the probability that Iit = 0 or Iit = 1 using the
density functions set out in section 3.5, but since we do not make any use of such an analysis we do not pursue
the matter.
3.5 Estimation Strategy





F ("it >  Zit) f (u2it j "it >  Zit) + F ("it   Zit) f (u1it j "it   Zit)
)
We allow the error terms to be freely correlated across equations and assume a multivariate normal distribution:
(u1it; u2it; "it)  N (0; ) where
 =
2421 12 1"22 2"
1
35 (5)
Note that 12 is not estimable (Maddala 1983, p. 224) since individuals cannot be simultaneously in two states.
Consider the case of Iit = 0: The truncated normal density is




f (u1it) f ("it j u1it)
 (Zit)
where () represents the cumulative standard normal distribution. Integrate over "it to get the marginal trun-
cated density for u1it
f (u1it j "it   Zit) =
f (u1it)
R Zit
0 f ("it j u1it) d"it
 ( Zit) (7)
noting that
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Similarly, the case of Iit = 1 results in





































Equation (11) shows that the likelihood function is, for each observation, a weighted average of the con-
tributions to the likelihood which would arise with pooled equations in levels and di¤erences respectively. The
weights, however, depend on unobserved characteristics. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood on
a pooled dataset. The e¤ect of correlation across waves for individual respondents was addressed by allowing
for clustering in the computation of standard errors. Strictly, therefore, we maximise a log pseudolikelihood.
3.6 Variables used in the analysis
The main variables of interest are those that relate to lifelong learning. Among those who acquire new quali-
cations, we distinguish between those whose highest level of qualication is increased as a result (that is, they
upgrade) and those whose highest level is left unchanged (not upgraded). We dene dummy variables Gains
Qualication: No Upgrade and Gains Qualication: Upgrade accordingly. These take the value 1 from the wave
in which the qualication is acquired onwards. Someone who gains a qualication without upgrading and then
subsequently gains one with upgrading will be indicated by the rst dummy until their upgrade, when they
are indicated by the second dummy. Someone who upgrades and then gains a further qualication retains the
dummy which results from their initial upgrading.
Beyond this, theory has little to say about what might be included as explanatory variables in equations
(2) to (4) and our strategy is therefore to include variables to control for sources of variation within our sample
which may be correlated with gaining qualications as a result of lifelong learning. All equations include the
following variables: qualication level when rst observed; a dummy variable indicating whether the highest
qualication at that time was academic8 or not; age; whether from an ethnic minority group or not; partnership
status (couple vs. single adult household), the presence of children (represented by a 0/1 dummy variable);
region (using dummies to indicate the region within Britain people live in); GDP or its change as an indicator of
the state of the economy; and local unemployment relative to the national rate. The switching equation includes
the variable Wave Gap which indicates the interval between interviews and a variable Recent Job indicating
whether the current job has started since the previous interview. Intuitively, people are more likely to be movers
if the gap between interviews is long than if it is short and those with a recent job change are more likely to
have experienced a wages shock that would be likely to classify them as movers. These variable are excluded
from the moversand stayersequations.
The e¤ect of rising overall prosperity is controlled for by including the growth rate of GDP in equation (3),
the wage equation for stayers. The logic behind this is that the rise people receive if their real wage is linked to
that of the previous year may depend on overall economic performance; we use GDP growth to represent this.
By contrast, we expect the wage rate of movers to depend on the ability of the economy to pay, and this is
indicated by the log of the level of GDP rather than by its rate of change. Both the level and the change in log
GDP are included in the switching equation (4). We also include a variable Regional Unemployment deviation.
8 An academic qualication is one which is normally taken in a school or university. Thus academic qualications are
GCSEs, AS and A-levels and their Scottish equivalents or university degrees and diplomas.
10 Please give a shorter version with: \authorrunning and \titlerunning prior to \maketitle
This captures the extent to which the local unemployment rate di¤ers from the national average, and so provides
a measure of the relative strength of the local economy.
The variables mentioned in this sub-section are either exogenous (age, ethnic group, wave of survey) or relate
to an earlier time period in order to reduce concerns about endogeneity.
Lastly, we include two types of variables in an attempt to control for selection e¤ects. Generalised Residual,
the generalised residual of the probit equation which explains attrition (see Appendix A), is included to control
for sample selection. To control for selection into learning (the possibility that individuals who participate in
lifelong learning might di¤er in some way from those who do not) we include indicators of whether individuals
obtain qualications at some time during the period for which we have data. Qualies Sometime: No Upgrade and
Qualies Sometime: Upgrade indicate, respectively, qualication acquisition at some point, with and without
upgrade. These are exclusive; someone who rst gains a qualication without upgrading and then a further
qualication with upgrading will be indicated only by the Qualies Sometime: Upgrade dummy.
We do not explicitly consider men with multiple jobs and how these might alter our conclusions. In fact,
multiple employment is quite rare; when rst observed, only eight percent of those in work held more than one
job. Interestingly, holding a second job was more common among the more highly qualied (thirteen percent
among those with level 5 qualications, compared to six percent among those with no qualications).
3.7 Parameters of the Mover-Stayer Model
We explored the system of equations in two forms. The unrestricted equation includes all four dummy variables
associated with gaining qualications in all three equations. We nd, however that they are highly insignicant
in the stayersequation; the Wald test statistic does not reject the restriction of setting these e¤ects to be zero
24 = 2:36:(p = 0:67): We therefore present results both for the unrestricted model and a restricted model in
which these terms are set to zero. The parameters of both equations are presented in table 5 and it is clear that
the restriction has very little inuence on the other parameters in the model. Since the restrictions are so easily
accepted our subsequent discussion is limited to the restricted model shown in columns four to six of table 5.
The Wald test for Generalised Residual (23 = 4:6, p = 0:21) suggests that we can reject the hypothesis that
signicant sample selection e¤ects are present in the model and the variable is plainly not signicant in any of
the three equations. Similarly, the control dummies (Qualies sometime: no upgrade) and (Qualies sometime:
upgrade) are not signicant in any equation, suggesting selection into lifelong learning may not signicantly bias
results.
The equation for movers shows that a qualication gained without upgrading enhances the wage of a mover
by 0.11 log units, while upgrading of education status raises the wage by 0.17 log units. Both are signicant at
a ve percent level. Thus we see clear e¤ects of lifelong learning.
The dummies for the initial level of educational attainment show a pattern broadly commensurate with
other studies. Dickson (2013) suggests an e¤ect of about ten percent per year of study. We show a clear e¤ect
of level 1 qualications, notwithstanding that the people who gain these usually have studied for no longer than
people who have no qualications. The coe¢ cient for level 5 education, 0.48, is commensurate with the idea that
a degree is achieved at age twenty-one, while someone with no qualications will probably have left school at
sixteen. The picture is, however complicated by two factors, which o¤set each other to some extent. People with
no qualications by denition, do not have academic qualications. On the other hand all level 5 qualications
are classied as academic. This incurs a penalty (albeit not signicant) of 0.075 log units shown in the movers
equation but delivers a faster rate of income growth to people when they are not movers. Moreover, adding the
relevant educational dummy to the academic dummy, the switching equation implies that people with academic
qualications at level 5 are appreciably more likely to be stayers than are those with lower levels of qualications.
Thus simulation techniques, of the type which we use to establish the benets of lifelong learning, would be
needed to establish the returns to the di¤erent levels of educational attainment. The equation shows that the
moverswages are increasing in real GDP, but the elasticity is surprisingly low.
The results for the stayersequation suggest few identiable inuences on the rate of growth of wages. In
particular, lifelong learning does not appear to increase wages for stayers. People with academic qualications
can look forward to a growth rate over one percent faster than those who do not have such qualications,
but otherwise nothing is signicant at a ve percent level. While it might be possible to impose further zero
restrictions on this equation, so as to form a more clearly specied notion of what inuences the wage growth
of stayers, that is outside the scope of this paper.
The switching equation is dened so that the larger the value of the latent variable, the more likely someone
is to be a stayer rather than a mover. Gaining life-long qualications makes it signicantly more likely that
someone will be a mover. The probability of being a stayer is positively related to the initial level of educational
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attainment,and those with academic qualications are more likely to be stayers. Not surprisingly, we can see
that a recent job is more likely to be associated with a move in the wage distribution. More broadly, the fact
that the probability of being a stayer increases with age and educational status is consistent with the idea that
qualications help people nd good job matches and that so too does the passage of time.
While these coe¢ cients show signicant e¤ects from life-long learning, we should not rush to conclude that
there are signicant e¤ects on discounted incomes. Men have to movein order to realise the benets of their
lifelong learning qualications and without some sense of the frequency with which this happens, it is not
possible to say whether the e¤ects shown in equation (2) will translate into e¤ects on wages with similar levels
of signicance. Obviously the uncertainty present in the other coe¢ cients of the model will inuence this. Thus,
to establish whether life-long learning has signicant e¤ects on wages, it is necessary to resort to simulation with
successive draws of parameter values made with reference to the covariance structure of the parameter set as a
whole. We present such simulations for both the restricted and unrestricted models in the subsequent section.
A separate question arises about the generality of the switching model relative to the simpler alternatives,
either that everyone is a mover with hourly earnings xed by an equation in levels, or everyone is a stayer with
hourly earnings explained by an equation in di¤erences. The former is the case if the latent variables generated
by the coe¢ cients of equation (4) are large and negative while the latter is the case if the coe¢ cients are large
and positive. The fact that some of the coe¢ cients are themselves statistically signicant does not answer this
question. We therefore defer it to section 5 where we simulate our model using repeated draws of coe¢ cients
from the distribution behind those of table 5. The simulated values of the latent variables address this question
directly.
Table 5 also shows the variance-covariance structure of the system. The standard error of the movers
equation, 1; is 0.32 while that of the stayersequation, 2; is 0.13, reecting the underlying structure of the
model that the wage conditional on being a stayer is much less variable than the wage conditional on being a
mover. The correlations, 1" and 2";relate to the correlations between the residual of the equation in question
and that of the switching equation (equation 4). Hence, the tendency to be a mover (conditional on observed
characteristics) is correlated with a tendency to have lower wages. Conversely, the tendency to be a stayer is
correlated with a higher rate of wage growth. Together, these ndings imply that stayers are likely to earn higher
wages.
4 Comparison with Other Models
There are three models with which it is worth comparing our results. As we noted in section 3.5, the likelihood
function is a weighted combination of the contributions that would be made, observation by observation, to
pooled models in log di¤erences and in log levels. Since the weights are designed to accommodate the data,
this procedure should be expected to result in a higher likelihood than would be found if the model were
estimated in levels or in di¤erences alone.9 The third relevant model is a xed e¤ects panel model in log levels.
Table 6 shows that, comparing the log-likelihoods, the mover-stayer model outperforms the pooled models in
levels and di¤erences, but it itself outperformed by the xed e¤ects panel model. Some adjustment is, however,
needed for the number of degrees of freedom. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) o¤ers a means of taking
account of this. It is, however, not clear how many observations there are with panel data. If all the observations
in each cluster coincided, then the number of observations would be the number of clusters rather than the
number of data points. Stata Manual (2014) suggests that using the number of data points, N1, in the BIC
calculation is the least favourable approach as far as the xed e¤ects model is concerned, while using the number
of clusters, N2; o¤ers the most favourable approach but that all models should be compared using the same
number of observations. Table 6 shows that on either basis the mover-stayer model is preferred to the other
three models.
We also show in table 11 of appendix C the results of estimating the xed e¤ects panel model. This shows
signicant e¤ects when upgrading to level 1 or to levels 3, 4 or 5. The restricted nature of the dynamics means,
however, that the model has nothing to say on whether the e¤ects of upgrading might become attenuated with
age. The e¤ects of age in the switching equation of our model, and the role that switching plays in realising the
benets of increased educational attainment mean that our model can address this.
9 It should be noted that the model in di¤erences is not simply the model in levels. In the former, variables explain
growth in wage rates while, in the latter, they explain the level of wage rates.
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Unrestricted Restricted
Mover Stayer Switching Mover Stayer Switching
Gains No upgrade 0.108 -0.001 -0.272 0.107 -0.273
Qualication (0.045) (0.004) (0.124) (0.043) (0.124)
Upgrade 0.166 0 -0.125 0.165 -0.126
(0.065) (0.010) (0.196) (0.063) (0.194)
Initial Level 1 0.215 -0.004 0.058 0.215 -0.004 0.058
Qualication (0.052) (0.005) (0.128) (0.052) (0.005) (0.128)
Level 2 0.306 -0.005 0.145 0.307 -0.006 0.143
(0.045) (0.005) (0.139) (0.044) (0.005) (0.139)
Level 3 0.337 -0.001 0.512 0.338 -0.002 0.512
(0.055) (0.005) (0.138) (0.054) (0.005) (0.138)
Level 4 0.404 0.007 1.057 0.404 0.007 1.056
(0.124) (0.005) (0.193) (0.123) (0.005) (0.193)
Level 5 0.482 0.003 0.975 0.483 0.002 0.971
(0.180) (0.006) (0.256) (0.179) (0.006) (0.255)
Other 0.053 0.004 0.092 0.054 0.004 0.091
(0.046) (0.003) (0.117) (0.046) (0.003) (0.117)
Academic -0.075 0.013 0.398 -0.075 0.013 0.399
qualication (0.052) (0.004) (0.121) (0.052) (0.004) (0.121)
Age 0.016 -0.001 0.078 0.016 -0.001 0.078
(0.015) (0.002) (0.041) (0.015) (0.002) (0.041)
Age2=100 -0.017 0.001 -0.073 -0.017 0.001 -0.074
(0.017) (0.002) (0.047) (0.017) (0.002) (0.047)
Public Sector 0.059 -0.005 0.059 -0.005
(0.039) (0.003) (0.038) (0.003)
Not White 0.081 -0.002 -0.156 0.081 -0.002 -0.157
(0.109) (0.009) (0.284) (0.108) (0.009) (0.284)
ln GDP -0.019 -2.71 -0.02 -2.69
(0.142) (2.265) (0.142) (2.260)
 ln GDP 0.157 0.74 0.158 0.742
(0.141) (0.387) (0.141) (0.386)
Regional unemp. 0 0 0.023 -0.001 0 0.024
deviation (0.009) (0.001) (0.023) (0.009) (0.001) (0.023)
Wave Gap -0.009 -0.01
(0.021) (0.020)
Recent Job -0.668 -0.669
(0.071) (0.071)
Generalised 0.035 0.027 0.692 0.033 0.027 0.69
Residual (0.210) (0.023) (0.453) (0.209) (0.022) (0.452)
Qualies No upgrade -0.023 0 0.07 -0.023 0.072
sometime (0.040) (0.004) (0.109) (0.040) (0.108)
Upgrade 0.054 0.007 -0.106 0.062 -0.124
(0.054) (0.008) (0.183) (0.054) (0.180)
i 0.322 0.132 0.322 0.131
(0.013) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003)
i" -0.290 0.191 -0.291 0.196
(0.118) (0.061) (0.118) (0.061)
N 10212 10212
Log-likelihood 3556.6 3555.9
Regional dummies and constant terms are also included. Standard errors are clustered.
Table 5 Parameters of the Mover-stayer Model
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Model Log- Deg. of Freedom N. Data N. Clusters BIC1 BIC2
likelihood k N1 N2
Levels -3917 29 10212 1511 8100 8045
Di¤erences 2622 29 10212 1511 -4976 -5032
Fixed E¤ects Panel 5088 1535 10212 1511 3994 1061
Mover-stayer Model 3556 93 10212 1511 -6255 -6432
BICi =  2Log-likelihood+k log(Ni). i = 1; 2
Table 6 Likelihoods of Alternative Models
5 Results: Returns to Lifelong Learning
In table 7 we show the returns to life-long learning generated by the restricted model from table 5 . Table
7 shows the percentage increase in discounted expected earnings from the age at which the qualication is
acquired (either thirty or forty-ve) to age sixty; a discount rate of two percent per annum is used. The results
are generated by repeated simulation of the experiences of a panel of 10,000 men over the life course. 1,000
simulations were carried out in order to provide the indicators of the distribution of the expected return. For
each simulation the parameters of the model were drawn randomly from a multivariate normal distribution
whose means are those shown in the tables and whose variance is given by the estimated covariance matrix of
the parameters. In these random draws, there is a risk that the resulting covariance matrix of the shocks to
the three equations of the model is not positive denite. Draws with this property were replaced by new draws.
The table also shows, in the nal column for each case, the proportion of simulations in which the discounted
expected earnings declined following the acquisition of qualications.
The model is non-linear, and the e¤ects therefore depend not only on the initial level of education, but also
on whether the highest qualication of the men in question is academic and on where they live.
Results are presented for men showing the returns as functions of their initial level of education, the age
at which they gain lifelong qualications and whether they upgrade their qualication level or not. The broad
pattern is that the impacts of lifelong learning are lower than the relevant coe¢ cients in table 5 suggest. The
reason for this is that our model suggests men have to movein order to realise the benets of lifelong learning
and the probabilities of such moves are fairly low. As a check we simulated the model with the probability of a
move set to 1, and, as expected, the simulations which result, showed the returns implied by the parameters of
the Gains Qualication terms in the moversequation.
The estimates of the e¤ects of gaining qualications do not di¤er greatly between the unrestricted model
(Appendix B, table 10) and the restricted model. Thus a man aged thirty who is initially educated to level 2 and
who upgrades his qualication level, is estimated to gain 12.0% in pay when the unrestricted model is used, and
12.9% when the restricted model is used. At age forty-ve the e¤ects are 6.8% and 5.2%. With the restricted
model we can see that, for men aged thirty whose highest qualication is not academic and who upgrade their
qualications, there is a signicant return at a ninety-ve percent signicance level10 for those educated at up
to level 3 before gaining their qualication. For those educated at level 4 the return is signicant at ninety
percent. For those with academic initial qualications, however, the returns are lower and are not statistically
signicant. If the qualication is not gained until age forty-ve, none of the returns is signicant at a ninety-ve
percent level and only for men initially educated to level 1 or 2 with a non-academic qualication is the return
signicant at the ninety percent level.
These di¤erences can be understood from the fact that, in order to benet from gaining qualications men
have to experience the short of shock which leads to them having their salary given by the moversequation;
it is here that signicant e¤ects on wages from life-long learning are found. It follows that men who have a long
expected time as stayers are less likely to benet signicantly from their additional qualications than are
those who are early movers. Moving is a stochastic phenomenon, but the switching equation allows us to work
out the probability that someone is a stayer and thus, in our simulated panel, the expected time that they wait
before a move. The e¤ects of age on the probability of staying are clearly positive suggesting that men are likely
to have to wait increasingly long for a move as they age. Similarly, the higher is the qualication level the more
likely it is that men will be stayers. Furthermore, men with academic qualications are more likely to be stayers
10 The condence intervals are calculated from the simulations; we do not make the assumption that the returns are
normally distributed. The lower limit of the ninety-ve per cent condence interval of the estimate of the return is given
by the 2.5 per centile of the ranked returns. We show in table 7 the proportion of simulations which result in a reduction
in the discounted wage and, when this is more than 2.5 per cent, the estimate is not signicant at a ninety-ve per cent
level. When it is more than 5 per cent the estimates are not signicant at a ninety per cent level.
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Non-academic Academic
Age 30 Mean S.D. %<0 Mean S.D. %<0
No 0 4.0% 0.044 17.9% -0.3% 0.044 49.5%
upgrade 1 4.9% 0.042 13.2% 0.9% 0.038 40.0%
2 5.2% 0.041 10.7% 1.5% 0.036 31.4%
3 3.9% 0.035 12.2% 0.9% 0.026 33.7%
4 1.6% 0.021 18.4% 0.1% 0.012 39.0%
5 2.6% 0.026 12.6% 0.6% 0.013 30.1%
Upgrade 0 12.8% 0.069 2.5% 8.4% 0.070 11.4%
1 13.0% 0.067 2.0% 8.6% 0.062 7.8%
2 12.9% 0.065 1.4% 8.4% 0.058 5.6%
3 9.9% 0.055 1.6% 5.4% 0.042 6.7%
4 4.9% 0.036 3.0% 1.9% 0.022 9.5%
Age 45
No 0 1.1% 0.031 35.0% -2.3% 0.026 84.2%
upgrade 1 1.8% 0.030 25.6% -1.6% 0.022 77.5%
2 2.0% 0.027 21.3% -1.1% 0.020 71.5%
3 0.4% 0.019 37.1% -1.0% 0.012 84.5%
4 -0.4% 0.009 68.3% -0.5% 0.006 92.6%
5 0.0% 0.011 50.2% -0.4% 0.006 87.4%
Upgrade 0 7.0% 0.052 7.5% 2.1% 0.047 31.0%
1 7.1% 0.049 4.8% 2.3% 0.039 25.0%
2 6.8% 0.047 4.2% 2.3% 0.036 23.9%
3 3.5% 0.032 9.2% 0.7% 0.021 35.5%
4 0.7% 0.015 25.1% 0.1% 0.011 52.1%
Table 7 The Returns to Lifelong Learning for Men acquiring Qualications at Ages 30 and 45
than men with non-academic qualications. Table 8 shows the expected time as a stayer, i.e. before a move,
for men initially aged thirty and forty-ve with di¤erent types of qualications; the e¤ects described are clearly
visible. This is calculated from the probability of being a stayer at each age, conditional on not having been a
stayer earlier.
The reason for this di¤erence is easy to understand by looking at the coe¢ cients of the switching equation in
table 5. The e¤ect of gaining qualications on the growth rate of stayersearnings is to add in very considerable
uncertainty around a zero, or in the case of upgrading, small positive average value. The implication of this is
that gaining a qualication makes the growth rate of earnings much more uncertain than it was in the absence
of the qualication and, as a result, the e¤ect on the discounted future wage is much less certain. The zero
restriction rules out this increased uncertainty.
A more general issue is how our estimates of returns to learning compare with those of other researchers.
Blanden et al. (2012) failed to nd a return to lifelong learning for men. However, de Coulon & Vignoles (2008),
working with the British Cohort Study found e¤ects of qualication acquisition on the wages of men aged twenty-
six to thirty-four ranging from ten to thirty percent depending on the qualication gained but with the lowest
returns for level 3 qualications. They did not distinguish men who upgraded their qualication levels from
those who did not do so11 . While they did not investigate the relationship between the returns to qualications
and initial qualication level, they did suggest that the e¤ect of gaining an NVQ2 level qualication was higher
for people with low ability than for the population as a whole, a nding consistent in broad terms with our own
results. More generally, the e¤ects shown are rather more powerful than our own. They therefore do not suggest
that our results are implausibly large.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the e¤ect of lifelong learning on mens earnings using data from the British
Household Panel Survey. We have done this using a model of wage evolution structured around a switching
regression. This model distinguishes two wage processes; some men receive wages close to those received in
11 They did include initial qualication level as a control variable, but this is not su¢ cient to distiniguish upgrading
from simply acquiring a qualication.
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Non-academic Academic
Age 30 Mean S.D. Mean S.D
No 0 4.0 1.6 9.1 3.3
upgrade 1 4.5 2.0 9.9 2.9
2 5.4 2.1 11.6 3.5
3 11.0 3.6 18.8 3.6
4 21.3 4.0 26.5 2.7
5 19.7 4.9 25.7 2.9
Upgrade 0 3.8 1.9 8.7 3.9
1 4.4 2.4 9.5 3.9
2 5.2 2.6 11.1 4.5
3 10.5 4.4 17.9 4.8
4 20.5 4.8 25.9 3.4
Age 45
No 0 7.5 1.8 10.9 1.8
upgrade 1 8.0 1.9 11.4 1.6
2 8.7 1.9 12.0 1.7
3 11.8 1.6 14.1 1.0
4 14.6 0.9 15.5 0.5
5 14.2 1.3 15.4 0.5
Upgrade 0 7.1 2.0 10.5 2.1
1 7.6 2.2 11.0 1.9
2 8.3 2.3 11.6 2.1
3 11.4 2.0 13.8 1.3
4 14.4 1.1 15.4 0.6
Table 8 Expected Number of Years as a Stayer
the previous year while others receive a wage which is related to their educational attainment, age and other
characteristics but which is not directly related to their previous earnings. The switching equation determines
the probability that each of these processes is relevant.
We nd that raising educational attainment a¤ects directly the wages of those whose earnings are not
directly related to those of the previous period with the consequence that the benet of increased attainment
is not gained until someone experiences the sort of random shock which means that his wages are no longer
necessarily close to those of the previous period. Such shocks are more common for younger than older men and
also for those whose educational attainment is not very high and whose highest qualication is not academic.
The consequence of these inuences is that we nd an increase in educational attainment boosts signicantly
the earnings of men aged 30 who are educated to level 3 or less and whose highest qualication is not academic.
For men who are aged forty-ve when they acquire their qualications, the returns, although lower, remain
signicant at a ten percent level for those initially educated to levels 1 or 2. Our model suggests that the
reason for this is that older men are more likely than younger men to remain as stayers, with earnings closely
related to their previous earnings. This means that policies to promote lifelong learning by older men need to
be combined with policies which ensure that such men have a greater opportunity than currently seems to be
the case to take advantage of any qualications they gain.
The existence of two regimes for wage determination is strongly supported by the results and this structure
permits a more nuanced understanding of the role of lifelong learning than is possible under the more usual
approach of assuming a single wage equation. It carries with it the implication that a single equation approach
is mis-specied. It should also of course be noted that it is perfectly possible that the returns of qualications
to men who do not gain qualications are di¤erent from those for men who do. As with all studies of this type,
it is not possible to explore that issue.
Our ability to explore the e¤ects of di¤erent types of qualication is limited by the data. However, the
results of our analysis speak to the importance of acknowledging the distinction between simply acquiring a new
qualication and acquiring a qualication that results in a demonstrable and visible skills upgrade.
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A Appendix: The E¤ects of Attrition
Sample attrition can arise due to survey non-response or to individuals being excluded for any of the reasons discussed
in the text (other than ageing out of the sample). A probit model was used to estimate the probability of attriting in the
next survey wave. Table 9 shows the estimated parameters. The score vector from this estimation provides the generalised
residuals (equivalently, the inverse Millsratio). These are then included in the main model to control for the possibility
that the unexplained component of attrition may be correlated with the residuals of any of the equations of our system.
Included in the probit model is a variable showing whether the interviewer changes between survey waves. This is likely
to a¤ect response because panel members may feel more comfortable about responding to a familiar interviewer. The
variable is not included in our main model, so acts as an instrumental variable to help with identication.























Regional dummies, wave dummies and a constant are also included.
Table 9 Coe¢ cients of the Probit Model of Attrition
B Returns to Lifelong Learning from the Unrestricted Model
Table 10 shows the results of the simulation for the version of the model in which the learning terms in the stayers
equation are not restricted to zero. The coe¢ cients on the learning terms are very close to zero and poorly determined
(table 5). It is therefore to be expected that there is little impact on the mean e¤ects but that the results are much less
well determined.
C A Fixed E¤ects Model
Table 11 shows the results of estimating a xed e¤ects model. In this model, each mans initial educational attainment
is absorbed into the individual-specic xed e¤ect. The term No upgrade shows the e¤ect of acquiring a qualication
which does not result in any change in the attainment level; the coe¢ cients by the other terms show the e¤ects of acquiring
a qualication at this level during the course of the survey, when it is at a level higher than previously. Upgrading to level
1 or to level 3 or higher has a signicant e¤ect on the hourly wage, while acquiring a qualication without upgrading does
not.
18 Please give a shorter version with: \authorrunning and \titlerunning prior to \maketitle
Non-academic Academic
Age 30 Mean S.D. %<0 Mean S.D. %<0
No 0 3.9% 0.050 20.4% -0.7% 0.064 52.0%
upgrade 1 4.7% 0.050 17.0% 0.3% 0.062 48.0%
2 4.9% 0.051 17.2% 0.7% 0.063 45.1%
3 3.1% 0.058 30.6% -0.1% 0.067 50.1%
4 0.6% 0.067 47.2% -1.1% 0.074 55.3%
5 1.5% 0.066 40.4% -0.6% 0.072 53.6%
Upgrade 0 12.1% 0.102 10.4% 7.8% 0.143 28.2%
1 12.2% 0.103 11.4% 7.9% 0.140 27.1%
2 12.0% 0.108 11.7% 7.7% 0.143 28.3%
3 9.2% 0.132 24.2% 5.2% 0.162 39.0%
4 4.8% 0.161 39.7% 2.5% 0.180 46.6%
Age 45
No 0 0.7% 0.042 43.5% -3.0% 0.043 74.8%
upgrade 1 1.4% 0.041 36.5% -2.3% 0.042 72.0%
2 1.4% 0.041 34.2% -1.8% 0.041 67.3%
3 -0.3% 0.040 53.8% -1.7% 0.039 66.1%
4 -1.1% 0.038 62.6% -1.2% 0.039 62.8%
5 -0.7% 0.039 58.2% -1.2% 0.038 62.7%
Upgrade 0 5.8% 0.086 22.8% 1.2% 0.098 44.7%
1 6.0% 0.083 22.2% 1.3% 0.094 43.7%
2 5.5% 0.085 23.8% 1.4% 0.093 43.7%
3 2.5% 0.087 37.9% 0.3% 0.092 48.5%
4 0.4% 0.090 48.4% -0.1% 0.093 50.5%
Table 10 Returns to Lifelong Learning from the Unrestricted Model




Gains No upgrade -0.011
Qualication (0.010)


























Regional dummies and a constant term are also included.
Table 11 Parameters of a Fixed E¤ects Model
